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The Intel Judgment:




 European Sugar Industry (1973)
 In a case involving primarily market-sharing agreements among European
sugar producers, a system of rebates conditional on exclusivity is found
to be an abuse of dominance.
 In Hoffman-La Roche (1979), a distinction is made between:
 Quantity rebates exclusively linked to the volume of purchases from the
producer concerned -- generally valid
 Fidelity rebates, the amounts of which are disconnected from the
quantities purchased, and which explicitly tie a customer to a supplier for
all or most of its requirements -- generally illegal.
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Historical Background
 In Michelin I (1983), the Court of Justice upholds the creation of a third
category of rebates – “fidelity-building” rebates – which resemble
quantity rebates, but are analyzed as having the same effect as fidelity
rebates, such as retroactive rebates for annual sales targets which may
correspond to exclusivity or near exclusivity
 “Fidelity-building” rebates require the consideration of all the
circumstances
 See also Michelin II (2006), British Airways (2007), Tomra (2012) and
Post Danmark II (2015)
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The Modernisation of Article 102
 Following the Article 101 modernisation initiative in the late 1990’s, an
“effects-based” approach to the interpretation of Article 102 (as
opposed to a “form-based” approach) gains traction within the
Commission
 In 2005, the Commission published its Staff Discussion Paper to
discuss the application of Article 102 to exclusionary abuses
 In 2009, the Commission issued its Guidance Paper on its
enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 to abusive
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings
 Clearly states that its provisions do not overrule past case law
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Article 102 Guidance Paper:  AEC Test
 In its Article 102 Guidance Paper, the Commission discusses rebates in 
which the “as-efficient-competitor” test is developed
23. “[…] Vigorous price competition is generally beneficial to
consumers. With a view to preventing anti-competitive foreclosure,
the Commission will normally only intervene where the conduct
concerned has already been or is capable of hampering competition
from competitors which are considered to be as efficient as the
dominant”
25. “In order to determine whether even a hypothetical competitor as
efficient as the dominant undertaking would be likely to be foreclosed
by the conduct in question, the Commission will examine economic
data relating to cost and sales prices, and in particular whether the
dominant undertaking is engaging in below-cost pricing […]”
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6Background of the Intel case
Intel AMD












7Examples of Alleged Abusive Practices
 Rebates conditional on a computer manufacturer purchasing
exclusively Intel CPUs
 Rebates conditional on a manufacturer purchasing no less than 80% of
its CPU needs for its desktop and notebook computers from Intel
 Payments to retailer Media Saturn Holding on condition that it
exclusively sold Intel-based PCs
The Commission decided that Intel’s rebates and exclusivity payments 
constituted an abuse of Intel’s dominant position, and imposed a fine of €1.06 
billion
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General Court Categorization of Rebates
 The General Court considered that Intel’s rebates were Category 2
rebates, which are effectively unlawful by their very nature. There was
no need to examine “all the relevant circumstances” of the exclusive
rebate, such as:
 the level of the rebate
 the duration of the rebate
 the market coverage affected by the rebate (no de minimis rule)
 the scope of the rebate (the fact that the rebate covers only a
segment of the customer’s requirements is irrelevant)
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Advocate General Wahl’s Categorization of Rebates
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“Where the undertaking submits during the 
administrative procedure ,on the basis of 
supporting evidence, that its conduct  was not 
capable of restricting competition and , in 
particular, of producing the alleged foreclosure 
effects”, then the Commission is required to 
analyze the capacity of the rebate to foreclose
(¶¶ 138-139)
Court of Justice Assessment of Rebates
 According to the Court of Justice, the Commission is required to
analyze (¶ 139):
 The extent of the undertaking’s dominant position on the relevant
market
 The share of the market covered by the challenged practice
 The conditions and arrangements for granting the rebates,
including duration and amount
 The possible existence of a strategy aiming to exclude
competitors that are at least as efficient as the dominant
undertaking from the market
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The “As Efficient Competitor” Test
 In its Decision, the Commission carried out an AEC test and concluded
that its analysis supported the conclusion that Intel’s rebates were
abusive. However, the Commission stressed that the AEC test did not
form part of the Decision. It argued before the Court that this aspect of
the Decision was not reviewable.
 As a result, the General Court did not address Intel’s criticisms of the
application of the AEC test by the Commission (¶ 146)
 The Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General Court for
not analyzing whether the rebates at issue were capable of restricting
competition and for failing to consider Intel’s arguments challenging
the Commission’s application of the AEC test (¶ 147)
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Objective Justification
 The Court of Justice considered the analysis of the capacity to
foreclose relevant in assessing whether a system of loyalty rebates
which, in principle, falls within the scope of Article 102, may be
objectively justified (¶ 140)
 “It has to be determined whether the exclusionary effect arising
from such a system, which is disadvantageous for competition,
may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms
of efficiency which also benefit the consumer”
 “[The] balancing of the favourable and unfavourable effects of the
practice in question on competition can be carried out in the
Commission’s decision only after an analysis of the intrinsic
capacity of that practice to foreclose competitors which are at
least as efficient as the dominant undertaking”
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A Few Questions Raised by the Judgment
 Is the AEC test required in all cases involving loyalty rebates?
 The Court refers to market coverage. What degree of market coverage?
Should the exemption applicable to exclusive agreements that is
contained in the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (i.e., below a 30%
market share threshold) also apply to fidelity rebates?
 Does the Court ruling apply to Category 3 rebates?
 Does this judgment give companies more leeway in designing their
discount schemes?
 What are the broader implications of this judgment for EU competition
policy?
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